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Abstract: Local content requirement policies typically call for a foreign investor to source 
a portion of its procurements from local suppliers in the domestic economy. Local 
content requirement policies have long been studied for various industries, and there is 
currently a vibrant debate on their design or implementation in extractive industries, 
such as minerals, oil, or gas, especially in resource-rich low-income countries. Our 
objective in this paper is to characterise optimal local content requirement policies in 
the context of extractive industries. If an optimal local content requirement policy serves 
to monetise the positive externalities from foreign investment, then it is, in essence, a 
Pigouvian subsidy, which is a first-best policy, but the incremental volume of business 
which it may induce is a function not only of the size of the positive externalities but 
also of the response of local suppliers to new business opportunities. We discuss four 
implications: providing high-powered incentives for investor compliance, harvesting the 
investor’s superior information, managing the host government’s administrative burden, 
and mitigating the risk of infantilising local suppliers. 
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1 Introduction 
Extractive industries, such as minerals, oil, or gas, could fuel economic development in 
resource-rich low-income countries. One popular development strategy is to establish a 
local content requirement (“LCR”) policy calling for a foreign investor to source a portion 
of its procurements from local suppliers in the domestic economy. LCR policies have long 
been studied for various industries (Grossman 1981), and there is currently a vibrant 
debate on their design or implementation in extractive industries, especially in resource-
rich low-income countries (Venables 2016; Marcel et al 2016; Bastida 2014; Adedeji et al 
2016; Ovadia 2016; Nwapi 2015; Morris et al 2012; Haddow 2014; Sutton 2014; Hanlin 
and Hanlin 2012; Hunter 2014; Tordo et al 2013; Ramdoo 2015; Kaiser 2014; Bloch and 
Owusu 2012; Kolstad and Kinyondo 2015; Hufbauer et al 2013; Adewuyi and Oyejide 
2012; Östensson 2014; Winkler 2014; Fessehaie 2012). Although sub-optimal LCR 
policies in extractive industries, as we discuss further below, likely have adverse 
economic consequences, the fundamental elements of optimal design or implementation 
seem to be poorly understood. Indeed Tordo et al (2013) claims that much of LCR policy 
analysis in the oil and gas sector has been qualitative. 
Our contribution to the debate is to characterise optimal LCR policies in the context of 
extractive industries. We have a distinctive approach to the modelling. Foreign 
investment potentially brings positive externalities to the domestic economy, such as 
new skills, the leverage of foreign capital, or local linkages. If an optimal LCR policy 
serves to monetise the positive externalities of foreign investment, then it is, in essence, 
a Pigouvian subsidy, which is a first-best policy. It follows that the concept of an optimal 
LCR policy, represented in the modelling as an optimal subsidy, arises from the 
maximisation of incremental economic welfare consisting of the policy cost, the 
incremental producer surplus enjoyed by local supply, and the social benefit arising from 
additional local supply above the natural level prevailing in the absence of an LCR 
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policy. In other words, depending on the circumstances, there is a natural level of local 
content due to the innate competitiveness of local suppliers without an LCR policy, and 
there is an efficient level of local content due to optimal LCR policy. 
However, the incremental volume of business which an optimal LCR policy may 
efficiently induce is a function of both the size of the positive externalities and the 
response of local suppliers to new business opportunities. The size of the positive 
externalities depends on the gap between the private values and social opportunity costs 
of labour or capital. The response of local suppliers to new business opportunities is 
contingent on their competitiveness. We posit in our model that local supply for an input 
required by the investor uses labour and capital under a decreasing returns-to-scale 
Cobb-Douglas technology which facilitates the representation not only of the gap 
between private values and social opportunity costs of labour and capital, but also of the 
potentially limited capability of local suppliers to respond to market signals. We 
demonstrate that the interaction between the size of the positive externalities and the 
capability of local suppliers has profound effects on optimal LCR policy. 
We discuss four implications for LCR policy. One is the high-powered incentives for 
investor compliance. The investor procures a higher quantity of local supply, and incurs 
a higher procurement cost, with the LCR policy than without it. In short, typically there 
is a policy cost. We propose that, although the policy cost is typically borne by the 
investor, it is ultimately shouldered by the government through a reduction in the 
royalty paid on the resource, as long as there is compliance. In other words, the investor, 
enjoying a royalty break if it complies with the LCR policy, is compensated for the policy 
cost it incurs. However, we further propose that, in the event of non-compliance, the 
government imposes a penalty equal to the foregone economic benefits comprising not 
only the incremental producer surplus which would have been enjoyed by local 
suppliers, but also the social benefit which would have been generated by additional 
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local supply above the natural level without the LCR policy. Inasmuch as the 
compliance cost, if the royalty break is properly estimated, is nil, even a small amount of 
foregone economic benefits is sufficient to cause a positive cost of non-compliance. As a 
consequence, the cost of compliance is likely lower than that of non-compliance, and the 
sensible course of action for the investor is to comply.  
Another implication for LCR policy is the harvesting of the superior information of the 
investor. An investor in extractive activities obviously has limited flexibility on its 
production location decision and thus is generally unable to engage in spatial cost 
arbitrage pitting production cost in one location against that in another. Thus, pretty 
much immobile, the investor located on-site is likely motivated to search diligently for 
cost saving opportunities wherever they could be found. As we discuss above, the royalty 
break, which is the compensation to the investor for the policy cost, is an estimate of the 
extra procurement cost incurred under an LCR policy. If the investor, relying on its deep 
knowledge and expertise, finds local suppliers which, at the appropriate quality, are 
willing and able to deliver at very low cost, then it may be able to reduce its actual extra 
procurement cost, and pocket the difference. We argue that the opportunity to secure 
cost savings until the LCR policy is adjusted over the policy cycle, akin to a process 
under price cap regulation, provides an incentive for the investor to search for the best-
performing local suppliers. This virtuous process, in turn, encourages local suppliers to 
be as competitive as possible and enhances the prospects for strengthening local 
linkages.  
A third implication for LCR policy is the management of the administrative burden on 
the host government. We assert that an optimal LCR policy minimises the risk, not 
uncommon amongst resource-rich low-income countries, of government mismanagement 
or corruption. Under an optimal LCR policy, the incentives for compliance or non-
compliance are not only based on economically sound principles (rather than on 
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arbitrary edicts), but also verifiable by a third-party, such as a judge, jury, or arbitrator, 
in the event of a dispute. As a result, the audit of policy benefits or costs is facilitated, 
and the scope for bureaucratic discretion is restricted, both of which are especially 
important if governance capacity in the host economy happens to be low. Moreover, the 
economic benefits of policy are delivered directly through the profit-maximising 
behaviour of an investor “on the ground” rather than indirectly through a possibly 
conflicted government bureaucracy “far away.” 
Finally, a fourth implication for LCR policy is the mitigation of the risk of infantilising 
local suppliers. Under an LCR policy, the maturation of local suppliers, enjoying 
protection from international competition, may be slow. We claim that the LCR policy 
cycle serves as a mechanism for monitoring the magnitude or direction of the 
performance of local suppliers. If local capability improves over time, the local supply 
curve is likely to shift out, indicating an increase in competitiveness, and the result is a 
higher quantity available at any given price. However, if, over the policy cycle, the local 
supply curve has not shifted out or is slow to shift out, there is an economically sound 
(rather than arbitrary) basis for changing or terminating the LCR policy. In other 
words, if the investor, after several LCR policy cycles, repeatedly finds uncompetitive 
sectors chronically unwilling or unable to respond to new business opportunities, then 
the government receives a clear market signal to alter or end policy support. 
Our approach is to deploy a high level of generality and abstraction in order to isolate 
the fundamental elements of the incentive problem and to support their application to a 
wide range of settings. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the principles underlying LCR policies in extractive industries. Section 3 describes the 
optimisation model and the calibration. Section 4 draws implications for the design or 
implementation of LCR policy. Section 5 offers a conclusion and identifies areas for 
further research. 
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2 Local content requirement policies in extractive industries 
It is not immediately obvious that extractive industries could be catalysts for economic 
development in resource-rich low-income countries. Extractive industries are highly 
capital intensive, and their spill-overs, such as linkages beyond enclaves, tend to be 
limited (Kaiser 2014; Boadway and Keen 2010). Their employment impact, especially 
upstream, is modest and relatively low-skilled (Kaiser 2014; McMillan and Rodrik 2011; 
Boadway and Keen 2010). In fact, it seems very difficult to rely on extractive industries 
for economic development. Venables (2016) narrates that, although harnessing 
extractive industries for development sounds straightforward, it is not easy at all, for 
various reasons, such as the intense pressure for current spending, the damage to other 
tradable sectors of an exchange rate appreciation due to resource exports (the so-called 
“Dutch disease” effect), a disproportionate dependence on a lone volatile source of 
income, weak governance, or political forces prompted by the potential for resource 
wealth. Indeed Venables (2016) reports that few developing economies have succeeded 
in doing so, and that “… economic growth has generally been lower in resource-rich 
developing countries than in those without resources.” McMillan and Rodrik (2011), 
providing evidence for China, India, other Asian countries, Latin America, and sub-
Saharan Africa, shows that the larger the share of natural resources in exports, the 
smaller the scope for productivity-enhancing structural change. Conducting a scholarly 
synthesis of a vast literature, Venables (2016) concludes that “… no single answer can 
be given to the question of why it has proven so difficult to harness natural resource 
wealth for broader economic development.”  
Another way of looking at the matter is to identify mechanisms for enhancing the value 
captured from extractive industries. The fiscal regime obviously plays a crucial role. 
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Boadway and Keen (2010) expounds on the characteristics of the resource sector. Given 
the prevalence of foreign ownership and the magnitude of tax receipts, tax revenue is 
likely to be the core benefit to the host country. There are high sunk costs and long 
production periods. Hundreds of millions of dollars could be spent over decades. In 
mining, it is not uncommon for 50 years to elapse between exploration and 
rehabilitation. Expenses are incurred early in the life of the project, often prior to the 
generation of cash flow, and then are sunk, with little if any alternative use. While the 
resource project is in the design stage, the prospective tax base is highly sensitive to the 
anticipated tax regime, but once sunk costs have been incurred, investors have little 
choice. As long as they can cover variable costs, producing is more profitable than 
ceasing operations and the tax base becomes relatively insensitive to tax design.  
There are, of course, other mechanisms for increasing value capture, such as harvesting 
the benefits from local economic linkages across the value chain. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) 
provides a discussion of the positive externalities arising from backward and forward 
linkages. A final-good firm increases the demand for inputs and induces a widening 
variety of specialised inputs. This backward linkage represents a positive externality to 
other final-good producers. The local production of increasing amounts of specialised 
inputs allows the competitive production of increasingly complex goods which 
intensively use specialised inputs. This forward linkage represents a positive externality 
to other input producers. Moretti (2010) offers a characterisation of local multipliers. 
The multiplier varies according to the type of job added or the type of industry. In the 
US, one additional skilled job in the tradable sector generates 2.5 jobs in local goods and 
services, but the corresponding figure for unskilled jobs is one, and high technology 
industries have the largest multiplier. Javorcik (2004) finds that positive productivity 
spill-overs from foreign investment occur through the interaction between foreign 
affiliates and their local suppliers in upstream sectors, and that spill-overs arise from 
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projects which have shared domestic and foreign ownership but not from those which 
are only foreign owned.  
There is evidence that local economic linkages can indeed be established across the 
value chain of extractive industries. Hunter (2014) narrates that, in Norway, consistent 
and decisive government policy aimed at building local industrial competence and 
implemented through statutes and licensing conditions succeeded in establishing cross-
sectoral linkages. Clark et al (2016) provides evidence suggesting that, in Africa, a 
heavy reliance on extractive activities, which stimulate manufacturing diversification 
through improvements in infrastructure, rising incomes, or expansions in the demand 
for locally produced goods, is not an obstacle to diversification. Kaplan (2012) shows 
that, in the mining equipment and specialist services sector, South Africa is 
technologically sophisticated and globally competitive. Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012), 
studying the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, demonstrates that, due to LCR policies and 
investments in telecommunications and transport, there are many local firms 
participating in the value chain. Bloch and Owusu (2012) shows that, due to backward 
linkages, gold mining in Ghana is no longer completely an enclave. An increase in local 
copper production in Zambia, Lippert (2014) chronicles, appears to have improved living 
standards in areas around the mines, even for households not directly employed in 
mining. Mine employee expenditures, Östensson (2014) asserts, are arguably at least as 
important as production linkages to employment. Strengthening the forward or 
backward linkages with the resource sector, Morris et al (2011) concludes, holds much 
promise for industrial development in resource-rich low-income economies.  
Nevertheless, strengthening local economic linkages is not easy. African countries have 
been trying to promote linkages with the commodities sector, but in general their efforts 
to encourage local content have had limited success (Morris et al 2011). After a century 
of gold mining, Ghana’s share of resource rents is small and its employment generation 
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remains low (ACET 2014). In most African countries producing gold, few of the goods 
and services supporting gold mining are sourced locally, almost all machinery and 
equipment are imported, and general consumables (e.g. office supplies) or specialised 
consumables (e.g. diamond dust, glue, industrial alcohol) are imported (Gajigo et al 
2012). For nearly five decades, ACET (2014) reports, Nigeria, a major oil exporter, has 
failed to establish a sustainable, competitive, and diversified economy. The situation, 
ACET (2014) further reports, is similar for copper in Zambia, cobalt in Democratic 
Republic of Congo, uranium in Namibia or Niger, and bauxite in Guinea. The positive 
experience of the Norwegian marine engineering sector or globally competitive national 
resource companies, such as Saudi Aramco or Petronas, is difficult to replicate in lower-
income countries (Venables 2016). Thus, although there is considerable scope for 
enhancing linkages in the mining sectors of developing countries in general and in 
Africa in particular, linkages in supply chains, labour markets, or wider networks tend 
to remain limited (Kaiser 2014; Morris et al 2011).  
Designing or implementing development policy specifically targeting economic linkages 
is a formidable challenge. Clark et al (2016) reviews a large literature on economic 
development strategies. There is a need both to produce new products with new 
technologies and to shift resources from traditional activities to new ones. There is also 
a need for government not only to gather information from the private sector as regards 
business constraints or opportunities, but also to engage in strategic coordination as 
regards the design, implementation, or monitoring of policy interventions. And there is a 
need for targeted industrial policy in order to diversify the manufacturing base. Tordo et 
al (2013) demonstrates that Asian economies have benefitted immensely from non-
neutral policies promoting specific industries, and that LCR policies, together with 
protectionism, fall under a category of interventions aimed at strengthening the 
productive structure of an economy. One of the economic reasons for using LCR policy, 
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Tordo et al (2013) continues, is to correct market failure, such as learning or production 
externalities. Mankiw (2009) expounds on externalities, which is a type of market 
failure, and Pigouvian tax or subsidy policies (named after British economist Arthur 
Cecil Pigou) for correcting them. A key axiom in the fundamental theory of welfare 
economics is the absence of externalities. If a transaction imposes a cost or confers a 
benefit on a party which is not part of the transaction, a failure to account for the 
negative or positive externality, respectively, could lead to an inefficient outcome. A 
simple remedy is to establish a tax on the external cost imposed or a subsidy for the 
external benefit conferred. One reason for the popularity of a Pigouvian tax or subsidy is 
that, restoring the efficient allocation without heavy government intervention, it is 
typically the least invasive way to remedy market failure.  
Veloso (2006), analysing positive externalities pertaining to learning or technological 
spill-overs, puts emphasis on the private and social valuations of labour or capital. 
Economic benefits for the local economy are generated as long as the quantity localised 
as a result of the LCR policy brings more social value than the additional procurement 
cost incurred by the investor. The negative surplus due to the investor’s extra 
procurement cost is compared to the positive surplus due to the difference between 
private and social valuations of labour or capital. In low-income countries, the private 
value of the input may exceed its social opportunity cost, and the difference is a positive 
externality. The investor continues to localise the quantity until incremental welfare 
gains are exhausted. For labour, training or skill acquisition increases the productivity 
of the worker. The alternative uses of the worker’s enhanced capability are limited, and 
its value in unrelated domestic activities elsewhere in the economy is low. As a result, 
the wage paid is higher than the worker’s social opportunity cost. For capital, the 
complementarity associated with foreign capital increases the marginal productivity of 
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domestic technology. As a result, the opportunity cost of capital in alternative but 
unrelated domestic activities elsewhere in the economy is also low.  
In the context of extractive industries, there are many difficulties in the design or 
implementation of LCR policy. For major resource companies, procurement is typically a 
specialised function managed from corporate headquarters rather than from their 
country offices (ACET 2014; Kaiser 2014), although there is evidence of a significant 
share of procurement decisions made by domestic management in Ghana, Chile, and 
Mozambique (Kaiser 2014). The extractive industries tend to rely on global supply 
chains not only to control costs and quality but also to ensure the reliability of supplies 
(Tordo et al 2013). A key determinant of linkage development is skills and firm- and 
sector-level capabilities (Kaiser 2014; Morris et al 2011; Winkler 2014). Local suppliers 
may have difficulty meeting the high standards or quality requirements of the investor 
(Levett and Chandler 2012). However, even if the local capability exists, local suppliers, 
Tordo et al (2013) explains, may still not win the business because the contract size may 
be too large, the contract may require an integrated package, or there may be 
information asymmetry between local and foreign contractors. Hanlin and Hanlin 
(2012), studying the purchasing procedures of large mining corporations and specialist 
construction companies in the East African gold mining industry, shows that the 
opportunities of local suppliers to provide goods or services are minimal due to the 
established relationships of lead firms. Marcel et al (2016), demonstrating the difficulty 
of achieving local content development in the extractives sector, shows that emerging 
producers (in the early stages of petroleum resource development) face particular 
challenges, such as “uncertainty in regard to their resource base, lack of petroleum 
sector experience and often limited state administrative capacity.” Moreover, although 
some forms of LCRs, under World Trade Organization (“WTO”) agreements, are 
prohibited, disciplined, or allowed, there has been a proliferation, partly because of the 
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wide range of interpretations of LCRs (Ramdoo 2015). Under WTO rules, the scope of 
LCR policy depends on the specific agreements or exceptions which a country has 
negotiated (Tordo et al 2013).  
Crucially, there is no “blueprint” for LCR policy inducements as regards compliance or 
non-compliance (Tordo et al 2013). Ovadia (2016), reviewing recent LCR policies in 
Uganda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, and Liberia, finds that LCR policies have been 
weakened in favour of a pro-business agenda and that key issues pertaining to definition 
and measurement, which have been major concerns in Angola or Nigeria, have been 
avoided. Ramdoo (2015), EY (2014), Kaiser (2014), PwC (2013), and Tordo et al (2013) 
provide examples of LCR or related policies for the oil and gas sector in Africa and 
elsewhere. Procurement from abroad requires prior approval. Certain services are 
provided only by local suppliers, completely excluding foreign contractors, or only by 
local suppliers or foreign contractors partnering with local suppliers. Preference is given 
to a local supplier if its foreign ownership is less than a certain percentage. There is a 
target local participation percentage to be achieved by a particular year. Some LCR 
percentages are variable, but others are fixed or increase in pre-defined increments over 
time. A bid with the highest local content percentage is selected if its price is within a 
certain percentage of the world price. Local workers are given preference over foreign 
workers. If local workers are not employed because of lack of training, the investor is 
required to provide training locally.  
Furthermore, the implementation of LCR policy, Tordo et al (2013) explains, is likely 
ineffective if the investor perceives that incentives, subsidies, or privileges may be 
voided, or a discretionary penalty, including nil, is associated with non-compliance. 
Ramdoo (2015) and PwC (2013) provide several examples from Africa of penalties for 
non-compliance. A levy of 1% is foisted on every contract awarded in the upstream oil 
and gas sector of the economy. Any violation of the LCR policy is liable for a fine of 5% of 
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contract value and may result in the cancellation of the contract. The use of local 
workers, goods or services, businesses, or financing is to be maximised to the 
satisfaction of a ranking government official. Compliance with the LCR is a condition for 
the renewal of licenses and permits in the oil and gas sector. Finally, special privileges 
granted to local suppliers could be politically difficult to remove even if their 
sustainability is doubtful (Tordo et al 2013). It is recognised that LCR policies cannot 
continue forever and that local suppliers must eventually be exposed to global 
competition (ACET 2014). It is unclear, however, if LCR or related policies for the oil 
and gas sector in general have specific provisions arranging for their orderly end. 
In summary, the structure of LCR policy matters immensely. Venables (2016), 
commenting on LCR policy, shows that “A number of countries have a domestic content 
requirement policy to strengthen these backward linkages, but such rules have 
generally not led to transformative growth of new activities … Rigid rules are gamed, 
and in any case do not come free; part of any cost increase they cause is borne by the 
host country through reduced tax and revenue receipts.” As we discuss above, various 
LCR policy provisions, individually or in combination, tend to have economic 
consequences, deliberately or accidentally motivating compliance or non-compliance. It 
would be ideal, therefore, if they are understood or optimised within a coherent model. 
As far as we could see, much of the academic literature on optimal LCR policy seems 
silent on the specific features of extractive industries, the interaction between positive 
externalities and local supplier capabilities, or any of the LCR policy implications we 
discuss above. Lahiri and Ono (2003), using an oligopoly model in which the 
intermediate input is produced using only labour under a constant returns-to-scale 
technology and the oligopolistic sector uses labour and the intermediate input under a 
Leontief production technology (i.e. factors of production are used in fixed or 
technologically pre-determined proportions), studies the effects of LCR policy on the 
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competitiveness of foreign firms locating in a host country and exporting their outputs to 
a third (consuming) country. In our model, the key factors affecting the optimal level of 
local content in the host country are the size of the positive externalities (contingent on 
the gap between the private values and social opportunity costs of labour or capital) and 
the response of local suppliers to new business opportunities (contingent on their 
competitiveness). Lahiri and Mesa (2006) analyses the impact of exchange rate volatility 
in the host and parent countries on host country LCR policy for export-oriented foreign 
investment, given an oligopolistic market in a third country. In our model, the effect of 
exchange rate volatility is unlikely to alter the key results or main insights, and the 
analysis is not focused on exchange rate volatility or a third country market. Qiu and 
Tao (2001) evaluates the implications of LCR policy for market penetration strategies of 
multinational firms. In our model, the investor’s location is taken as a given, and the 
analysis is not focused on market penetration. Lahiri and Ono (1998), using a partial 
equilibrium oligopoly model, analyses the location decision of firms across alternative 
markets as a function, amongst others, of the LCR policy. In the extractive industries, 
the investor, heavily influenced by the quality of the resource, tends to have limited 
flexibility on its production location decision. Kwon and Chun (2009), examining the 
interaction between LCR policy and the technology transfer decision of a multinational 
firm, finds that the technology transfer decision depends on the technological inferiority 
of the host country, the scale of technology diffusion, and the training cost of 
transferring advanced technology, and that raising the LCR could encourage the 
multinational firm to establish its own intermediate input supplier (i.e. vertical 
integration). In our model, the analysis is centred on the investor’s decision to purchase 
local goods or services rather than to engage in vertical integration as a response to the 
local level of technology. In short, our impression is that much of the academic literature 
on optimal LCR policy does not look fit for our purpose. 
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Veloso (2006), building on Grossman (1981) and the early literature, brings a unique 
perspective on LCR policies. A maximisation model of economic welfare is used to 
estimate base line and optimal levels of local content for the automotive sector. Foreign 
investment often generates spill-overs through backward links and may create a gap 
between private and social valuations of resources, and the resulting level of local 
content may fall below the optimal level. An LCR policy can improve economic welfare if 
externalities are taken into account in the decisions of private economic agents, but the 
government subsidises the investor as compensation for the additional procurement 
costs. Our work, extending Veloso (2006), explores the interaction between positive 
externalities and local supplier capabilities, its implications for optimal LCR policy, the 
concept of a royalty break, its implications for compliance rewards and non-compliance 
penalties, the investor’s profit-maximising behaviour encouraging local suppliers to be 
competitive, and the market signal for amending or halting the LCR policy.  
 
3 Model 
We focus on a single tradeable input which the investor, operating over a long 
production period, needs. The investor, having decided that producing is preferable to 
not producing, wishes to procure an amount 𝑞𝐷 of input from local supply or imports, 
and takes, as given, the world price of the input. Prices and quantities reflect quality-
adjusted cost and the investor, as a consequence, is indifferent between local and 
imported supply. The assumption on quality-adjusted cost does not hinder the key 
results or main insights. It is convenient that a Cobb-Douglas functional form depicts a 
consistent relationship not only between inputs, outputs, and technical efficiency, but 
also between the returns to scale and the shape of the supply curve. Local supply 
deploys labour 𝑥1 at the private wage 𝑤1 and capital 𝑥2 at the private cost of capital 𝑤2, 
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and is subject to a Cobb-Douglas technology 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑥1
𝑎𝑥2
𝑏 with decreasing returns to 
scale 𝑎 + 𝑏 < 1, indicating an upward sloping supply curve. Decreasing returns to scale 
tend to occur at high levels of output, and the firm could become difficult to manage, 
especially if there is a large order to fill. At the profit-maximising equilibrium, the 
inverse supply of a perfectly competitive Cobb-Douglas firm is 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑆𝑤1
𝑚𝑤2
𝑛𝑞𝐿
𝑢 in which 
𝑆 = [𝑎
−(
𝑎
𝑎+𝑏
)
] [𝑏
−(
𝑏
𝑎+𝑏
)
], 𝑚 =
𝑎
𝑎+𝑏
, 𝑛 =
𝑏
𝑎+𝑏
, and 𝑢 =
1−𝑎−𝑏
𝑎+𝑏
. Import supply at the world price 
𝑝𝑊 is perfectly elastic. Without policy intervention, if local supply is competitive enough, 
in equilibrium a part or all of 𝑞𝐷 is procured locally and the rest, if any, is imported. The 
portion 𝑞𝐿
∗ competitive vis-à-vis imports and procured locally without policy intervention 
constitutes the natural level of local content, or what Veloso (2006) labels the base line. 
Proposition 1: There is a natural level of local content, even without an LCR policy. 
Proof: At the world price 𝑝𝑊, supply of a perfectly competitive Cobb-Douglas firm, which 
is derived as the optimal choice of output given optimal factor demands or as the first 
derivative of the total cost function with respect to output, is 𝑞𝐿
∗ = (
𝑝𝑊
𝑆𝑤1
𝑚𝑤2
𝑛)
1
𝑢 ≤ 𝑞𝐷. This is 
the natural level of local content without an LCR policy, and the volume, if any, above it, 
but only up to 𝑞𝐷, is imported. ■ 
By inspection, 𝑞𝐿
∗ is decreasing in the private wage 𝑤1 or the private capital cost 𝑤2. If 
either of them increases, the local supply curve shifts upward, resulting in a lower 
quantity available at a given price and indicating a reduction in competitiveness. But if 
either of them decreases, the local supply curve shifts downward, resulting in a higher 
quantity available at a given price and indicating an increase in competitiveness. If the 
downward shift of the local supply curve results in 𝑞𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝐷, local supply would already 
be at least as competitive as imported supply and the economic rationale for an LCR 
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policy becomes moot. If 𝑞𝐿
∗ < 𝑞𝐷, the difference between them is imports, an indication of 
the limited competitiveness or capability of local supply. 
Now, consider a government objective to increase the local content above the natural 
level 𝑞𝐿
∗ through an LCR policy. Assume the government has ample scope for LCR policy 
under WTO rules. The government searches for an optimal level of local content 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  
which maximises incremental economic welfare (“IW”) within a limit defined not only by 
the positive externalities arising from the gap between private and social values of 
wages or capital, but also by the competitiveness or capability of local supply. IW has 
three components: policy cost (“PC”) typically borne by the investor (but ultimately 
shouldered by the government), incremental producer surplus (“IP”) enjoyed by local 
supply, and social benefit (“SB”) arising from additional local supply above 𝑞𝐿
∗. PC is a 
welfare loss, but IP and SB are welfare gains. In equilibrium, given the capability of 
local supply, 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , which is the optimal level of local content, reflects a balance between 
the negative surplus caused by extra procurement costs and the positive surplus arising 
from the gap between private and social values of wages or capital. 
Proposition 2: There is an optimal level of local content.  
Proof: By definition, 𝐼𝑊 = −𝑃𝐶 + 𝐼𝑃 + 𝑆𝐵. 𝑃𝐶 = (𝑝𝐿
∗ − 𝑝𝑊)𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  in which 𝑝𝐿
∗ is the price at 
which inverse supply 𝑝𝐿 produces 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , or 𝑝𝐿
∗ = 𝑆𝑤1
𝑚𝑤2
𝑛𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ 𝑢. 𝐼𝑃 =
𝑝𝐿
∗ 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗
2
−
𝑝𝑊𝑞𝐿
∗
2
 in which 
the first term is producer surplus under 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  and the second term is producer surplus 
under 𝑞𝐿
∗. 𝑆𝐵 = (𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ − 𝑞𝐿
∗)𝑝𝑊 shows that additional output above the natural level of 
local content is valued at 𝑝𝑊. The objective of a social planner, with respect to 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , is to 
maximise IW, subject to two constraints: 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ ≤ 𝑞𝐿
∗́ , indicating an upper bound defined 
by the quantity implied by inverse supply 𝑝?́? at the social values of labour and capital; 
and 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ ≤ 𝑞𝐷, indicating an upper bound defined by the investor’s input requirement. 
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We formulate the Lagrangian 𝐿 = 𝐼𝑊 − 𝜆1(𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ − 𝑞𝐿
∗́ ) − 𝜆2(𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ − 𝑞𝐷). Differentiating 
with respect to 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , 𝜆1, and 𝜆2 yields Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
−(𝑢 + 1)𝑆𝑤1
𝑚𝑤2
𝑛𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ 𝑢
2
+ 2𝑝𝑊 − 𝜆1 − 𝜆2 = 0 
𝜆1(𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ − 𝑞𝐿
∗́ ) = 0 
𝜆2(𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ − 𝑞𝐷) = 0  
𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , 𝜆1, 𝜆2 ≥ 0 
In equilibrium, 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ = [
2(2𝑝𝑊−𝜆1−𝜆2)
(𝑢+1)𝑆𝑤1
𝑚𝑤2
𝑛 ]
1
𝑢
. ■ 
Given that the investor procures, at most, only what it needs, the second constraint in 
the maximisation is obvious, but the first constraint merits further discussion. In 
principle, an increase in the private wage 𝑤1 or capital cost 𝑤2 shifts the inverse supply 
𝑝𝐿 upwards to the left. However, social values 𝑤1́ < 𝑤1 and 𝑤2́ < 𝑤2 imply an inverse 
supply 𝑝?́? which enjoys an imaginary shift out downwards to the right of inverse supply 
𝑝𝐿. In other words, for inverse supply 𝑝?́?, a higher quantity is available at any given 
price. The magnitude of the imaginary shift reflects the size of the positive externality 
caused by the difference between the private and social values of labour or capital. 
Evaluating inverse supply 𝑝?́? at 𝑝𝑊 yields 𝑞𝐿
∗́ , which has the characteristic 𝑞𝐿
∗ < 𝑞𝐿
∗́ ⋚ 𝑞𝐷, 
depending on the magnitude of the gap between private and social opportunity costs of 
labour or capital. Thus, 𝑞𝐿
∗́  is an upper bound associated with the positive externality. 
The larger the gap between private and social values of labour or capital, the further out 
the downward shift of inverse supply 𝑝?́?, and the higher the upper bound 𝑞𝐿
∗́  (and 
potentially the higher 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ ). 
By inspection, 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  is increasing in 𝑝𝑊, implying that the lower 𝑝𝑊 (the stronger the 
competition from imports), the lower 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ . Intuitively, as an extreme example, if the 
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imported input is free, the investor has no incentive to buy local. However, for a given 
𝑝𝑊, our model determines whether or not the balance between the positive and negative 
surpluses is adequate to eliminate some or all of imports. In the presence of widespread 
unemployment or idle capital, it is tempting to establish a very high LCR, up to the 
point of eliminating all imports, ostensibly to capture the benefits from a substantial 
gap between private and social values of wages or capital cost. In other words, it is 
understandable for government to desire the additional economic welfare potentially 
available as a result of a hefty outward shift in inverse supply 𝑝?́?. However, if local 
suppliers are significantly uncompetitive, it may not be efficient to establish 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ = 𝑞𝐷 
through an LCR policy, even if the social opportunity costs of labour or capital are 
extremely low. 
Proposition 3: For a given 𝑝𝑊, the lower the competitiveness of local supply vis-à-vis 
import supply, the smaller is the optimal level of local content.  
Proof: We investigate the impact of the competitiveness of local supply on 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  through a 
calibration. Consider the following parameter values: 𝑎 = 0.10, 𝑏 = 0.39, 𝑤1 = 1.50, 𝑤2 =
0.20, 𝑝𝑊 = 40, and 𝑞𝐷 = 60. The value for 𝑤1 can be viewed as a wage of $1.50, and the 
value for 𝑤2 can be viewed as a capital cost of 20%. Given the parameterisations, 𝑞𝐿
∗ =
33.92 (see Figure 1). If, for example, the social value of labour is 50% of its private value, 
𝑤1́ = 0.75, and the social value of capital is 75% of its private value, 𝑤2́ = 0.15, then 
𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ = 48.42, which is approximately 80% of 𝑞𝐷 (see Figure 2). 𝜆1 is binding, but the 
positive externality, or the gap between private and social opportunity costs of labour or 
capital, is not large enough to eliminate imports. If the social values of labour and 
capital are merely 20% of their private values, 𝑤1́ = 0.30 and 𝑤2́ = 0.04, then 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ = 60 
(see Figure 3). 𝜆2 is binding, all imports are eliminated, and the optimal level of local 
content could far exceed 60 if not for the constraint 𝑞𝐷 = 60. However, if the figure for 
parameter 𝑏 is reduced to 0.35, resulting in a significant steepening of inverse supply, 
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even if 𝑤1́ = 0.30 and 𝑤2́ = 0.04, the natural and optimal levels of local content fall 
dramatically, 𝑞𝐿
∗ = 17.85 and 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ = 28.87, which is less than 50% of 𝑞𝐷 (see Figure 4). 
Neither 𝜆1 nor 𝜆2 is binding, and the localised quantity at which the positive externality 
is balanced by the investor’s higher procurement cost is not enough to eliminate imports, 
even if labour or capital have few uses elsewhere in the economy. ■ 
Now, apart from the determination of 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ , there is a need to study the incentives 
encouraging compliance or discouraging non-compliance. In the context of LCR policy, 
the incentive to comply is a function of the costs of compliance and non-compliance 
(Tordo et al 2013). Compliance costs are the expense of applying LCR policy, and non-
compliance costs reflect both the probability of detecting non-compliance and the 
magnitude of the penalty imposed. First, consider compliance costs. In an optimal 
subsidy model, PC is the cost to the government and, depending on its budget, the 
government would need to build political support for the subsidy. Under an LCR policy, 
in the absence of compensation, PC is the additional procurement cost which the 
investor typically tolerates in order to provide protection for local suppliers which are 
unwilling or unable to compete with imports at 𝑝𝑊. Without compensation, compliance 
cost for the investor is positive. Veloso (2006), invoking an analytical simplification, 
assumes that the government subsidises the investor as compensation for the extra 
procurement costs. We suggest that, instead of funding the subsidy from general 
government accounts, if the royalty paid by the investor is reduced by PC, then the 
government’s fiscal regime for the natural resource ultimately shoulders PC. With 
compensation, compliance cost for the investor is nil.  
Next, consider non-compliance costs. Assume a probability of detection greater than 
zero. The penalty for non-compliance has to be economically meaningful (rather than 
punitive or indiscriminate). Here we rely on the economics of contract law. Cooter and 
Ulen (2014) reviews the concepts of efficient breach and expectations damages. There 
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are situations in which breach of contract is more efficient than performance. Breach is 
efficient if the costs of performing on the contract exceed the benefits to the parties. Due 
to a windfall or an accident, resources required for performance are more valuable 
elsewhere. Expectations damages restore the position of a breach victim as if the other 
party had performed. As a result, the breach victim “… is equally well off whether there 
is performance, on the one hand, or breach and payment of damages, on the other.”  
In the context of optimal LCR policy, the government, as it were, writes a contract with 
the investor for the “delivery” of economic welfare. In the event of breach, which is non-
compliance on the part of the investor, expectations damages are the efficient form of 
restitution. Non-compliance prevents local suppliers from serving the investor’s 
additional procurement, curtails the replacement of part or all of imports, thwarts the 
internalisation of positive externalities, and prevents the enjoyment of economic 
welfare. We assert that, under an optimal LCR policy, defining the penalty as the 
foregone economic benefit from non-compliance restores the wellbeing of society as if the 
investor had performed. Let us now bring together the costs of compliance and non-
compliance. If, in the event of compliance, the policy cost is ultimately shouldered by the 
government through a royalty break and if, in the event of non-compliance, a penalty 
equal to the foregone economic benefit is imposed, then the investor has high-powered 
incentives to comply. 
Proposition 4: Providing compensation for PC in the event of compliance and imposing a 
penalty equal to the foregone economic benefit in the event of non-compliance constitute 
high-powered incentives for the investor to comply with the LCR policy, assuming the 
probability of detection is greater than zero. 
Proof: By definition, PC, a negative surplus, is the investor’s extra procurement cost 
above the cost of procuring 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  at a price exceeding 𝑝𝑊. If the investor receives 
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compensation for PC, the cost of compliance is nil. The foregone economic benefit 
consists of positive surpluses IP and SB. If the detection probability exceeds zero, the 
investor compares a nil compliance cost to a positive non-compliance cost and observes 
that the former is preferable to the latter. ■ 
Discarding the assumption of a detection probability exceeding zero does not completely 
remove the investor’s incentive to comply. Regardless of the detection probability, the 
compliance cost continues to be nil. If the detection probability is zero, the investor, 
comparing a nil compliance cost to a nil non-compliance cost, might conclude that they 
are indistinguishable. However, depending on the ease of finding and transacting with 
local suppliers at the quality-adjusted cost, the investor, receiving PC over the policy 
cycle, has the potential to incur an extra procurement cost which is lower than PC. In 
other words, the investor may still procure up to 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ . Thus, even if it could somehow get
away with cheating, the investor may continue to have an incentive to comply. 
4 Implications for policy design or implementation 
We discuss four implications for LCR policy. First, the high-powered incentives for 
compliance are consistent with market or policy signals influencing investment 
decisions. The extra procurement cost incurred by the investor ceases to be a further 
cost burden if compensation, such as a royalty break, is provided. Cost factors, such as 
access to raw materials, land, facilities, specialist inputs, fiscal incentives, labour and 
non-labour, or skills, figure prominently in a list of FDI location decision drivers 
identified by foreign mining companies (Kaiser 2014). A payment, whether it is called a 
royalty or a tax, has the same effect from the perspective of the investor or policy design, 
and a royalty, a charge levied on the extraction of the resource, could affect extraction, 
exploration, or development decisions (Boadway and Keen 2010). Moreover, the royalty 
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break, interpreted as a tax incentive, is convenient to implement. For a host country, 
providing tax incentives is easier than addressing deficiencies in infrastructure or 
skilled labour, is politically less difficult than disbursing funds, and does not require an 
expenditure of funds or cash subsidies (OECD 2007).  
For its part, the non-compliance penalty consisting of the foregone economic benefits is 
neither punitive nor uninformed, and certainly is a market-based signal. Evidence of 
slack in the economy could indicate opportunities to be monetised or a lack of the 
willingness or ability to win new business. In the event local suppliers are extremely 
uncompetitive, it may be unwise to aspire for a high LCR even if the social valuations of 
labour or capital are low, or to impose capriciously harsh penalties for non-compliance 
even if local supply appears to have excess capacity. Adedeji et al (2016), studying the oil 
industry in Nigeria, finds that the LCR policy statistically has a positive and significant 
effect on local value creation, but that the effect is lower than expected. Teka (2012), 
analysing the Angolan oil and gas industry, explains that, despite the realistic and 
strategic potential, local value-added links are limited to labour or basic services due, 
amongst others, to a weak local content strategy and low skills. In Ghana, Guinea, 
Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso, notwithstanding the presence of rich deposits of gold, 
iron ore, bauxite, uranium, copper, and diamonds, there is limited local participation in 
mining supply chains, despite the current or potential capacity (World Bank 2012). In 
the Nigerian oil industry, despite the promotion of indigenous ownership and an LCR 
policy, the capacity of indigenous firms remains underutilised, and the industry remains 
dominated by foreign firms handling projects which could be done by local firms (Ihua 
2010). Moreover, it is vital that the penalty is a reliable estimate of the opportunity cost 
to society of non-compliance and represents a clear signal which the investor can 
confidently use in making procurement decisions. After all, resource-rich countries have 
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to remain attractive to investment, even as they use mining as a catalyst to diversify 
their economies (Haddow 2014).  
Second, harvesting the superior information of the investor encourages local suppliers to 
be as competitive as possible. The host government is generally less informed about 
geological or commercial circumstances than the investor (Boadway and Keen 2010). We 
argue that, in the ordinary course of business, the investor located on-site is highly 
likely to have a much better understanding of the challenges of local contracting than 
government bureaucrats located elsewhere. We further argue that the implementation 
cycle for an optimal LCR policy is essentially a process of price cap regulation. Church 
and Ware (2000) describes a rudimentary form of price cap regulation. The price is 
allowed to increase by the difference between the general rate of consumer price 
inflation and a factor reflecting the cost increase beyond the control of the firm. The cap 
is periodically reviewed and updated. If the firm is efficient and, before the next review, 
able to cut cost by more than the factor, then it gets to keep the cost savings. 
Under an optimal LCR policy, the compensation for PC, the cost of procuring additional 
local supply above the natural level, is based on an estimate of the extra procurement 
cost incurred under 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗ . This estimate is prepared and adjusted over the LCR policy 
cycle. The investor, using its deep knowledge and expertise, has a strong incentive to 
find efficient local suppliers before the next cycle of adjustment in order to push the 
actual below the estimated extra procurement cost, and then to pocket the difference. In 
other words, the investor would be highly motivated to quicken the search for the best-
performing local suppliers in order to capture the savings between the actual and the 
estimated extra procurement cost. As a result, competition amongst local suppliers 
intensifies, and the prospects for strengthening local linkages improve.  
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On their part, local suppliers which win new business would have replaced part or all of 
imports, and positive externalities would have been internalised. As successful local 
suppliers increase in competitiveness, the local supply curve would have shifted out and 
a higher quantity is thus available at any given price. Kaiser (2014) demonstrates that, 
over the last 40 years, Chile, emphasising supplier upgrading programmes, has achieved 
higher levels of local procurement, with far less government regulation, than Africa. 
Sutton (2014) describes promising initiatives in which the investor works closely with 
selected local firms to enhance their competitiveness. Winkler (2014) recommends that 
policy should encourage supplier development and assistance, enhancing the 
sophistication of production processes, in order to strengthen absorptive capacities 
which have been shown to increase linkages with foreign investment.  
Third, the administrative burden on the host government is manageable. The quality of 
governance, Fukuyama (2013) demonstrates, is a function of the interaction between 
capacity and autonomy. If in the short-run a country cannot significantly upgrade 
capacity, the degree of autonomy or discretion should be reduced in a low-capacity 
country but increased in a high-capacity one (Fukuyama 2013). A focus on 𝑞𝐿𝐶𝑅
∗  
simplifies compliance reporting, supports the audit of policy benefits or costs, facilitates 
verification by a third-party, such as a judge, jury, or arbitrator, in the event of a 
dispute, and restricts the scope for government discretion. The complexity of licensing 
procedures, which may vary according to economic activity, location, size, or legal status, 
may hinder small business and supplier development (Kaiser 2014). In the Nigerian oil 
industry, the conditions of participation in the LCR policy, such as seemingly arbitrary 
charges or fees, or the provision of bank statements as part of the pre-qualification, 
could be burdensome (Ihua 2010). By contrast, under an optimal LCR policy, there 
would hardly be a need for arbitrary edicts, such as bid-selection rules based on some 
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percentage of the world price, or subjecting the localisation of workers, goods and 
services, businesses, or financing to the whim of host government officials. 
Moreover, under an optimal LCR policy, the investor’s action is induced to serve as a 
policy tool for internalising positive externalities, strengthening the productive 
structure of an economy, and delivering gains in economic welfare. It is widely known 
that, in a number of resource-rich low-income countries, there is a high risk of 
government mismanagement or corruption. Nwapi (2015), evaluating the LCR policy 
affecting the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, finds that the risk of corruption arises from 
conflict of interest, discretionary power, lack of transparency in contracting, and the 
potential for “facilitation payments.” Now, regardless of the fiscal regime design, if the 
institutional and administrative capacity of the government is under-developed, it is 
likely that fewer revenues are collected or fewer benefits captured (ACET 2014). In 
Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso, policy provisions reflecting a 
preference for local suppliers which can match the cost and technical features of imports 
have usually been insufficiently developed, disseminated, monitored, or enforced (World 
Bank 2012). By contrast, Levi-Faur (2012) provides a conceptualisation of governance in 
which the market itself is mobilised as a regulatory mechanism. We assert that, under 
an optimal LCR policy, the economic benefits of policy are delivered directly through the 
investor which has a profit motive to search for local suppliers and encourage them to be 
competitive. Proceeds from extractive industry activities can be used to fund directly the 
construction of roads, schools, or medical facilities in the host country (ACET 2014). A 
low capacity for governance, therefore, is unlikely to pose a barrier to optimal LCR 
policy design or implementation. 
And fourth, the risk of infantilising local suppliers is likely mitigated. Until local 
suppliers are fully exposed to international competition, they receive a price above the 
world price and may inadvertently remain weak. For early-stage local content projects 
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serving the oil industry in Angola, low cost or quick delivery is not always the most 
compelling reasons, and mandates, risk insurance, or a social license to operate are used 
(Levett and Chandler 2012). Under an optimal LCR policy, as we discuss above, there is 
a natural process for monitoring the magnitude or direction of the performance of local 
suppliers. If the local supply curve has not shifted out or is slow to shift out, the lack of 
competitiveness could be chronic, an indication that local suppliers, despite the new 
business opportunities available to them, may be unwilling or unable to assist in the 
process of internalising the positive externalities. On the evidence of a performance-
based market signal, therefore, policy support may have to be adjusted or cut. Indeed 
Marcel et al (2016) suggests that “A sequenced approach to the development of local 
content may help to keep policy in line with evolving geological and market 
circumstances as well as changing domestic capabilities.” 
Although there are many other factors adversely affecting the competitiveness of local 
supply, the lack of education and training or access to finance is likely to have a direct, 
negative impact on the gap between private values and social opportunity costs of labour 
or capital. Investors are keen to increase the localisation of management and technical 
staff, but the main obstacle is perceived to be the lack of available local skills (Kaiser 
2014). In Angola, although the critical human capital problem in the oil sector is higher 
technical level personnel, especially the metallurgical sector, training programmes focus 
on mid-level technical training, the output of oil and gas industry training institutes and 
programmes is very low, and, despite the growth in the number of universities, they 
provide training mostly in the social sciences and offer limited training in engineering 
(much less, petroleum engineering) (Teka 2012). In the Nigerian oil industry, locally 
trained experts and skilled manpower are inadequate due to falling standards of 
universities and other tertiary institutions, and Nigerian tertiary institutions tend to be 
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under-funded or ill-equipped to produce the quality of graduates needed for the oil and 
gas business (Ihua 2010).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the high costs of capital and difficulties in accessing finance, in 
addition to the lack of access to business premises and unreliable supply of utilities, are 
some of the key challenges which make it difficult for local suppliers to establish 
businesses and compete effectively (Kaiser 2014). In Angola, access to capital is a major 
constraint to the growth of local small- and medium-scale enterprises serving the oil 
industry (Levett and Chandler 2012). In Nigeria, there is a need for banks to expand 
their services, such as insurance, with emphasis on the oil and gas business; enhance 
their ability in loan syndication for projects requiring huge capital outlay; and fight an 
inclination for offering loans to foreign rather than local firms serving the oil and gas 
industry (Ihua 2010). In Ghana, small- and medium-scale suppliers and service 
companies serving the mining industry have difficulty in accessing finance and face high 
interest rates (Bloch and Owusu 2012).  
 
5 Conclusion 
An optimal LCR policy serving to monetise the positive externalities from foreign 
investment is essentially a first-best Pigouvian subsidy. It could induce an incremental 
volume of new business, depending on the gap between the private values and social 
opportunity costs of labour or capital, as well as on the competitiveness of local 
suppliers. We investigate the policy implications related to the high-powered incentives 
for investor compliance, the harvesting of the superior information of the investor, the 
management of the administrative burden on the host government, and the mitigation 
of the risk of infantilising local suppliers. It would be interesting to study situations in 
which an investor elects not to comply despite evidence of competitive local suppliers, or 
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local suppliers proven to be severely uncompetitive continue to receive policy protection 
from international prices. Either situation could bring much insight not only on the size 
of the positive externalities in the economy, but also on the willingness or ability of local 
suppliers to respond to new business opportunities.  
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Figure 1 Natural level of local content 
 
 
Figure 2 Natural and optimal levels of local content 
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Figure 3 Natural and optimal levels of local content, low shadow values 
Figure 4 Natural and optimal levels of local content, uncompetitive local supply 
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